How Do Firing Costs Affect Innovation and Growth when Workers' Ability is Unknown? – Employment Protection as a Burden on a Firm's Screening Process by Berdugo, Binyamin & Hadad, Sharon
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
How Do Firing Costs Affect Innovation
and Growth when Workers’ Ability is
Unknown? – Employment Protection as
a Burden on a Firm’s Screening Process
Binyamin Berdugo and Sharon Hadad
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
August 2008
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11410/
MPRA Paper No. 11410, posted 8. November 2008 15:50 UTC
 1
How Do Firing Costs Affect Innovation and Growth 
 when Workers' Ability is Unknown? – Employment 
Protection as a Burden on a Firm's Screening Process  
 
Binyamin Berdugo and Sharon Hadad 
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev 
 
August 2008 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the implication of employment protection legislation on a firm's 
screening process. We present a model in which human-capital-intensive firms (high-
tech) with imperfect information about their workers' type attempt during a trial 
period to identify those incompetent workers who they will subsequently dismiss. 
Employment protection measures, however, place a burden on this screening process 
and thereby motivate innovators to embark on medium-tech projects which are more 
flexible in their human capital requirements. Employment protection legislation 
thereby distorts the pattern of specialization in favor of medium-tech firms rather than 
high-tech firms and consequently slows down the process of economic growth. The 
results of the paper are consistent with documented data on Europe versus US 
productivity growth and specialization patterns as well as with employment protection 
legislation in those economies.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades there has been a dramatic rise in US productivity and output 
growth accompanied by a remarkable expansion of US human-capital-intensive 
industries. These trends, however, were paralleled by different paths in most 
European countries of lower growth rates and a tendency to specialize in less human-
capital-intensive technologies.1 Several recent theories suggest that these differences 
can be related to a host of labor market regulations (such as, minimum wage laws, 
unemployment subsidies and firing costs) that are rarely applied in the US but are 
extensively used in Europe. For example, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) argue that 
a tax on job destruction, such as a firing cost in various European countries, may slow 
down the reallocation of resources from declining industries to growing industries 
thereby hampering economic growth by reducing productivity. Another explanation 
by Saint-Paul (1997) and (2002) is that, due to innovation risks, employment 
protection legislation might distort the pattern of specialization in favor of mature 
goods rather than primary innovation, which negatively affects productivity and 
growth. Other more recent works emphasize the effect of labor market regulation on 
delays and barriers to technology adoption (see Gust and Marquez (2004) and Alesina 
and Zeire (2006)). 
In this paper we offer another explanation to the differences between European 
and US productivity and specialization patterns which is based on the burden that 
firing costs impose on a firm's screening process. We show that high-tech firms with 
imperfect information about their workers' ability attempt during a trial period to 
identify those incompetent workers who they will subsequently dismiss. Firing costs 
stemming from employment protection legislation, however, place a burden on this 
                                                 
1See Gordon (2000) Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000 ,2007) and  Van ark and Omany (2005)  
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screening process, thereby motivating innovators to embark on projects which are 
more flexible in their labor requirements (such as medium-tech projects). 
Employment protection legislation therefore distorts the pattern of specialization in 
favor of medium-tech firms rather than high-tech firms and consequently slows down 
the process of economic growth.  
The paper presents a model in which a final good is produced by many 
intermediate goods that can be upgraded in a quality-ladder fashion (see Grossman 
and Helpman (1991a, 1991b) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)). These intermediate 
goods, however, are not identical, since they differ in their productivity rates per 
quality rank and their labor requirements. Specifically: 
1) High-tech intermediate goods are much more human-capital-intensive 
than medium-tech goods, and suffer from lower substitutability between 
skilled and unskilled workers. 
2) Per quality rank, high-tech intermediate goods are much more 
productive than medium-tech goods and therefore generate higher 
economic growth. 
An important assumption of the paper is that the workers' type is unknown, and is 
revealed only after a certain period of employment (which we henceforth term the 
"trial period"). Following this trial period, both medium-tech and high-tech firms have 
the opportunity to dismiss any incompetent workers. However, due to differences in 
labor requirements, only high-tech firms have the incentive to dismiss incompetent 
workers, whereas medium-tech firms can continue to keep them with no significant 
loss of profits. Thus, firing costs affect the profit function of high-tech firms 
significantly more than medium-tech firms and therefore affect the decisions of 
innovators of whether to embark on a high or medium-tech project. 
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The paper has three central results. First, employment protection legislation (and 
various firing costs that stem from them) biases the pattern of specialization from 
human-capital-intensive products toward less human-capital-intensive products. 
Second, firing costs can negatively affect economic growth. In closed economies this 
negative effect is unambiguous, while in open economies the magnitude of this 
negative effect depends on firms' adjustment costs. Third, employment protection 
might trap the economy into adopting inferior technologies which can affect the 
trajectory of innovation and growth over a long period of time. A major consequence 
of this latter result is that measures taken belatedly to reduce firing costs might prove 
ineffective.  
The paper also relates to two other important issues. The first concerns the impact 
of firing costs on worker flows in the face of adverse selection. This issue was 
recently analyzed by Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004) who showed that firms who face 
high firing costs tend to hire workers from a pool of already employed workers rather 
than from a pool of unemployed workers who are most likely to be lemons. In our 
paper, imperfect information on workers' skills and firing costs also play a significant 
role, however not by affecting worker flows, but rather by affecting project selection 
and thereby specialization and growth.  
The second issue our model addresses is why income and growth vary across 
countries. This problem has been addressed in a literature that focuses mainly on 
income and growth differences between developed and underdeveloped economies, 
that are either caused by impediments to technology adoption and/or differences in 
institutions and human capital accumulation.2 Unlike this literature, our paper 
                                                 
2
 See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969), Parente and Prescott (1994), Basu and Weil (1998), Zeira (1998),  
Acemoglu and Robinson   (2000,2001,2002), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Galor, Moav and 
Vollrath (2008) and Galor and Mountford (2008). 
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compares the pattern of growth between two developed economies that differ in 
growth patterns due to differences in regulation and specialization.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model; 
Section 3 relates employment protection legislation to growth in closed as well as in 
open economies; Section 4 extends the basic model; and Section 5 concludes. The 
mathematical proofs appear in an appendix. 
 
2. The Model  
Consider a closed economy whose activities extend over an infinite discrete time.3 
The economy consists of three types of goods: a final good Y that is used for 
consumption only, and two types of continuum intermediate goods xi and zi which we 
denote by “medium” and “high,” respectively. The quality of both the “medium” and 
“high” intermediate goods can be potentially improved over time in a quality-ladder 
fashion (see Grossman and Helpman (1991a, 1991b) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)), 
however they differ in their improvement rate (i.e., quality rank intervals). Formally, 
the final good is produced by intermediate goods xi and zi in a constant return to scale 
technology which is given by:  
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where 0<σ<1 (i.e., the elasticity of substitution between factors of production 1/(1-σ) 
is higher than one); jix ,  and jiz ,  are the quantities of intermediate goods of types x 
and z
 
of quality j in product line i; and λ1(i) and λ2(i) are parameters that reflect the 
improvement rate of intermediate goods xi and zi, respectively. 
                                                 
3The open economy analysis is left for the next section.  
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To keep the analysis simple and to highlight the effects of interest, several 
assumptions are used: 
(1) High-tech products are much more productive per quality rank than the 
medium-tech products, which implies that for any two product lines ix and iz 
of intermediate goods of types x and z, the inequality  )()(1 21 zx ii λλ <<  must 
hold.  
(2) All products of type x have identical quality rank intervals (such that λ1 is 
constant across all intermediate goods of type x) 
(3) Intermediate goods of type z are positioned by a decreasing order of their 
quality rank intervals such that λ2(i1)≥λ2(i2) for all i1<i2. We assume that λ2(i) 
is a twice-differentiable monotonically non-increasing and weakly convex 
function of i (i.e., 0)(2 ≤′ iλ  and 0)(2 ≥′′ iλ ). 
(4) To reach an equilibrium in which innovators always employ a limit pricing 
strategy we also assume that )1(21 )( −<< σσλλ i . 
The quality rank intervals of high-tech and medium-tech products are shown in Figure 
(1). 
  [Insert Figure 1 Here]  
2.1 Individuals  
At each period of time, a generation L of individuals is born. All individuals live 
for one period only and have identical concave preferences denoted by u=u(c). There 
are two types of individuals in the economy: a portion (1-µ) of less-competent 
individuals and a portion µ of most-competent individuals (0<µ<1). Less-competent 
and most-competent individuals differ in productivity when employed in the 
production process of intermediate goods.  
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Within the population of competent individuals, there exists a measure ν>0 of 
individuals who we henceforth refer to as "innovators." It is assumed that innovators 
are the only individuals in the economy who have the skill to upgrade existing 
intermediate goods. This skill is manifested in the ability of innovators to establish 
firms through which they upgrade existing products and subsequently manufacture 
them.4  
Ex-ante, members of the economy know the probabilities of being either 
incompetent or competent (i.e.,µ and (1-µ), respectively), however, they do not know 
their own type nor the types of others.5 During the production process, however, 
employers can reveal their workers' type if they employ them for at least a 0<β<1 unit 
of time. We therefore refer to the sub-period [0,β) as a "trial-period."6  
 
2.2 Intermediate Goods Production 
All intermediate goods are produced by a linear production function in which 
labor is the only primary factor. Intermediate goods differ, however, in their labor 
requirements. We assume that one unit of intermediate good of type x (regardless of 
whether x is of an old vintage or a state-of-the-art product) is produced by either one 
unit of competent workers or 1/θ units of less-competent workers (where θ>1).  
                                                 
4
  To simplify the analysis, we ignore the fact that when innovators establish innovative firms, their 
skill is revealed. We justify this by assuming that the number of innovators ν is relatively very small 
compared to the total number of skilled individuals in the economy. 
5
 In section 4 we show that the results of the model hold even when we relax this assumption and 
assume instead asymmetric information (i.e., that all individuals know their own type but do not know 
the type of others). 
6
 In this model we assumed an "ex-post screening process" whereby workers are employed until 
detected and then are dismissed. An alternative modeling would be to assume an "ex-ante screening 
process" in which employers test workers before they are employed. Obviously, the "ex-ante screening 
process" is less accurate than the "ex-post screening process", and become more reliable when firms 
spend more resources on screening. Thus, both type of screening (ex-ante and ex-post) become more 
costly when firing costs rise and therefore create a similar (negative) effect on high-tech firms' profit 
function.  
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Intermediate goods of type z, however, differ in their production technology 
according to whether they are of an old or new vintage. Specifically, one unit of an 
old vintage of zi,j can be produced by either one unit of less-competent or (1/θ)<1 
units of competent workers, whereas a state-of-the-art product zi,j can be produced by 
competent workers only. Formally, the production functions of intermediate goods x 
and z are given by: 
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where lu and ls are labor inputs of less-competent and most-competent workers, 
respectively. The differences in labor requirements between high tech and medium 
tech products are a core assumption in our model. It implies that the appropriability of 
workers in the high-tech firms is much more significant than in the medium-tech 
firms, since, competent and less-competent workers are highly substitutable in the 
medium-tech sector, whereas in the high-tech sector, less-competent workers are 
totally unproductive. The production function (2) implies that medium-tech producers 
have no incentive to dismiss workers, while high-tech producers would like to dismiss 
incompetent workers as soon as they are revealed (i.e., subsequent to the trial 
period).7  
For the sake of concreteness, we add two additional assumptions. The first is 
that the production technology of old-vintage products can be instantly and costlessly 
adopted, while the production technology of the state-of-the-art products can be 
                                                 
7
 The specific production functions in equation (2) are chosen for simplicity only, and the results carry 
through with other production functions in which less-competent and most-competent workers exhibit 
significantly higher substitutability in medium-tech than high-tech products.  
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adopted only after one period of time. Second, we assume that all innovators can 
ensure the success of the innovation process by carrying-out some R&D activities that 
cost G  units of the final good Y. G is assumed to be very small and identical for all 
innovators in all sectors.  
The first assumption implies that innovators who upgrade the quality of 
intermediate goods became monopolistic producers for one period only, and then are 
replaced. The second assumption allows us to focus on the effect of incomplete 
information in the allocation of resources by disentangling it from other effects (such 
as differences in R&D risks as in Saint-Paul (1997) and (2002)). 
 
2.4 Equilibrium 
We start our analysis by describing how wages are determined. During the 
trial period, all workers (competent as well as incompetent) are paid in equilibrium a 
salary wu which is exactly the marginal productivity of incompetent workers. When 
the workers type is revealed, however, the salary of competent workers (who can now 
be identified) becomes θwu, while the salary of incompetent workers remains wu. We 
also assume that competent workers have a sufficient bargaining power to demand a 
full compensation for the loss of their income [β(θ-1)wu] caused by the inability of 
their employers to identify them during the trial period.8 We assume that workers who 
were dismissed from their high-tech jobs do not bear frictional searching costs since 
they immediately find an alternative job in the medium tech sector.9  
Let the final good Y serve as a numeraire. Profit maximization by firms, which 
produce the final good, leads to the following first order condition:  
                                                 
8This assumption does not affect the results of the paper, but it does significantly simplify the 
innovators' profit functions.  
9
 In section 4 we relax this assumption and show that the results of the paper still hold even when 
workers who were dismissed bear a certain level of frictional searching costs. 
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At each period of time t, final good producers can purchase intermediate goods from 
both competitive as well as monopolist producers. In the case where intermediate 
good xi,j and zi,j are purchased from competitive firms, their competitive prices must 
be equal to their constant marginal costs (i.e., wzpxp jiji == )()( ,, ). If, however, the 
intermediate goods xi,k(i) and zi,k(i) are purchased from monopolistic innovators (who 
just tapped the state-of-the-art products), then final good firms will be willing to pay a 
premium for these products as long as their prices are not higher than λ1⋅p(x) and 
λ2(i)⋅p(zi), respectively. Innovators, who own the monopolistic firms, would clearly 
not charge prices below λ1⋅p(x) and λ2⋅p(zi), respectively. Thus, the monopolistic 
prices are given by: 10 
wizp
wxp
i )()(
)(
2
1
λ
λ
=
=
               (4) 
where w is the real wage of unskilled workers. By substituting equation (4) into 
equation (3), we get the final good producers demand functions for products x and z:  
                                                 
10
 The assumption that 1< λ1 <λ2(i) < σ(σ-1) implies that firms who produce the state-of-the-art products 
(leaders) always employ a limit-pricing strategy. Under an alternative condition that 
21
)1( λλσ σ <<−w , innovators would set a price which is not lower than )1( −σσw . The assumption 
that )1(21
−<< σσλλ , however, ensures that monopolistic prices can never be reached and instead the 
innovators can set a price that is sufficiently below the monopoly price so as to make it just slightly 
unprofitable for potential producers of the last version of the product.   
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To characterize the repercussion of mandatory firing costs on the pattern of 
specialization, we now describe how innovators rank intermediate goods in terms of 
profits. Note that due to labor requirements, only the innovators who operate in the 
high-tech sector (z products) might be motivated to dismiss workers. Thus, mandatory 
firing costs, if they exist, appear only in the high-tech firms' profit function. 
Suppose that at the beginning of some period t, an innovator considers 
whether to operate in the high-tech or the medium-tech sector. If the innovator 
decides to operate in the medium-tech sector then his profit function is given by:  
Gxwx −−= )1()( 1λπ       (6) 
If the innovator decides to operate in the high-tech sector (i.e., to produce a state-of-
the-art product of type z), then he cannot detect, at least not during the trial period 
[0,β), whether the workers he hires are productive or not.  Thus, innovators who 
improve and produce intermediate goods of type z hire workers only of whom a 
portion µ is productive. Innovators therefore face two alternative paths. They can 
either dismiss the unproductive workers when detected (after a [0,β) sub-period of 
time) and bear the mandatory firing costs, or can continue hiring them throughout the 
production process while bearing the costs of paying them salaries. The profit 
functions under each alternative path are given by:11 
                                                 
11Innovators may use another screening process in which they test workers before they are employed. 
It is easy to see that this "ex-ante screening process" is equivalent to the "ex-post screening process" 
assumed above. The higher are firing costs F, the more reliable is the required screening process and 
the higher are the firms' outlays.  Thus, both type of screening (ex-ante and ex-post) become more 
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where F is a mandatory rate of firing costs expressed by the portion of wage income 
that employers must compensate dismissed employees. The following lemma relates 
the mandatory firing costs to operating profits in the high-tech sector. 
Lemma 1:  
(i) Whenever the mandatory firing cost F is lower than ββ )1( − , innovators who upgrade 
and produce a state-of-the-art product of type z would rather dismiss unproductive 
workers than continue hiring them. If, however, F> ββ )1( − , innovators who upgrade 
and produce a state-of-the-art product of type z would rather continue to hire 
unproductive workers than dismiss them.   
(ii) For any product i of type z, such that µθθµλ )1(12 )( −+>i , operating  profits are positive 
for all possible mandatory firing costs F. 
(iii) For any product i of type z, such that 
µθ
θµ
µθ
βθµβ λ )1(12
)( )( −+−+ << i , there exists a 
threshold value )1(
))(()()()( 2
µβ
βθµβλµθ
−
−+−
=
iif   such that any mandatory firing 
cost )(ifF >   necessarily leads to negative operating profits. 
Proof: Follows immediately from equation (7). 
 Innovators' profit functions in each sector as given in equations (6) and (7) 
allow us also to establish the conditions under which innovators rank a certain zi-
                                                                                                                                            
costly when firing costs rise and therefore create a similar (negative) effect on high-tech firms' profit 
function.   
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project either higher or lower than x-projects. Obviously, these ranking conditions 
also depend on the mandatory firing cost F. The following Lemma states these 
conditions: 
Lemma 2: Suppose that µθ
µλλ −+<<< 121 1)(1 i , and that at period t-1, the quality 
rank of all products of type x is (jx-1). Then, for any product i of type z with quality 
rank )1( −
iz
j , there exists a threshold value: 
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such that whenever the mandatory firing cost F is higher than )(if , innovators rank 
the  x projects higher than project zi (i.e.,  )()( xFiz π<Π ), and, vice-versa, whenever 
the mandatory firing cost F is lower than )(if , innovators rank the zi project higher 
than the x  projects (i.e., )()( Fx
iz
Π<π ). 
Proof: By substituting equation (5) into the profit functions that are given in 
equations (6) and (7) we get that: (i) if µθµλλ −+<<< 121 1)(1 i  then whenever ββ )1( −≥F , 
x projects are always more lucrative than z projects, and (ii) if ββ )1( −<F and )(ifF <  
then project zi is more lucrative than projects of type x. 
Note that since innovators' profits depend on the quality rank of the product they are 
updating and producing, the threshold value )(if must increase with the incipient 
quality rank of products z   (jz), and must decrease with jx. 
 
Lemma 3: )(if and )(if  are non-increasing functions of i. 
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Proof: It easy to see that since 0)(2 ≤′ iλ , the functions )(if and )(if  must satisfy  
0)(
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≤
∂
∂
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≤
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∂
i
if
. 
We now examine the effect of mandatory firing costs on the specialization pattern in 
the economy. Let us denote by Xt⊆[0,1] and Zt⊆[0,1] the sets of intermediate goods of 
type x and z,  respectively, that innovators upgrade and produce at period t. Since 
intermediate goods of type z are ordered by decreasing rates of improvement (per 
quality rank), and since innovators always prefer to be engaged in the most rewarding 
projects, then the set Zt must be either an empty or a closed interval of the 
form ]ˆ,0[ tt zZ = .12 Note that the set Xt need not be path-connected, however, since all 
projects in Xt are equally rewarding, we can assume, with no loss of generality, that 
the set Xt, if nonempty, is always a closed interval of the form [0,a]. 
 
Definition 1: Let A and B be two economies with an identical number of innovators ν. 
Economy A is said to be more specialized in high-tech projects than economy B (while 
economy B is said to be more specialized in medium-tech projects than A) if 
)()( BXAX tt ⊂  and )()( BZAZ tt ⊃  . 
We now show that due to Lemmas (1),(2) and (3), high mandatory firing costs 
bias the pattern of specialization toward medium-tech products. Specifically, we show 
that whenever the incipient quality rank of products z are at least equal to the incipient 
quality rank of products x (i.e., jx≤jz), then Zt(F) is a non-increasing monotonic set 
                                                 
12
 The set Zt, if nonempty, always contains a continuum of intermediate goods such that if i∈Zt then 
every intermediate good j of type z with lower index j<i (which is by definition more or at least equally 
rewarding than i) must belong to Zt as well. 
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function of the firing cost F while Xt(F) is non-decreasing monotonic set function of 
F.13 We start our analysis with the following definition and notations.  
Definition 2: For a given firing cost F: 
(1) Let )(Fi denote the highest index i of intermediate goods of type z that yields 
non-negative operating profits. Formally, )()( 1 FfFi −= .  
(2) Let )(Fi  denote the lowest index i of intermediate goods of type z that is 
ranked either higher or equal to the most profitable projects of type x. 
Formally: )()( 1 FfFi −= .14 
(3) Let F* and F** denote the lowest mandatory firing cost such that 0*)( =Fi , 
and 0*)*( =Fi , respectively.15 The threshold conditions expressed by the 
functions )(Fi and )(Fi as well as the points F* and F** are shown in Figure 
2. 
   [Insert Figure 2 Here] 
Lemma 4: If the incipient quality rank of high and medium tech sectors are identical 
(i.e., jx=jz), then, the set functions Zt(F) and Xt(F) are uniquely determined by the 
number of innovators ν and the functions )(Fi  and )(Fi . Namely, if the number of 
innovators is lower than one (i.e., 10 ≤≤ν ), then 
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13
 Thus, if F1<F2 then Xt(F1)⊆Xt(F2) while Zt(F2)⊆Zt(F1). 
14
 The function )()( 1 FfFi −=  can be considered as the marginal index of products z that makes 
innovators indifferent between project x and project zi. 
15
 Note that since all projects of type x gain positive operating profits, then whenever jx≤jz, the 
inequalities )()( FiFi <  and thereby F*<F** must hold. 
 16





≥
<≤−
>
=
**],0[
**)()](,0[
)(
)(
FFifv
FFandvFiifFiv
vFiif
FX t
φ
 
  
(This case is shown in Figure 3-A below.) 
If the number of innovators is higher than one but lower than two (i.e., 21 <≤ν ) then  
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 (This case is shown in Figure 3-B below.) 
 If the number of innovators is higher than two (i.e., ν≤2 ) then  
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and  
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(This case is shown in Figure 3-C below.) 
An immediate consequence of Lemma 4 is the following fundamental result.  
Proposition 1: Whenever jx=jz, high mandatory firing costs bias the pattern of 
specialization toward medium-tech products. Namely, the inclusion relations 
)()( 21 FXFX tt ⊆  and )()( 21 FZFZ tt ⊇  hold for any two mandatory firing costs 1F and 
2F such that 21 FF < . 
[Insert Figures 3-A, 3-B, and 3-C here] 
Lemma 4 and Proposition 1 clearly demonstrate that high firing costs bias the 
pattern of specialization toward medium-tech products. We now show that high firing 
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costs might, under certain conditions, create technological traps, in that, if a policy of 
firing-cost-reduction is adopted too late, it will be ineffective in shifting innovators 
from medium to high-tech products. To demonstrate this phenomenon let us assume, 
for example, that due to high firing costs, a certain economy has specialized in 
medium-tech products for a significant period of time, whereby the quality rank of 
products that innovators persistently developed and produced grew, while the quality 
rank of high-tech projects that were previously abandoned stagnated. Under such 
conditions, a policy that strives to reduce firing costs might not be effective since 
profits (even with zero firing costs) in abandoned high-tech products become 
significantly lower than already developed and produced products.  The following 
proposition state the condition under which this "technological trap" occurs.  
Proposition 2: Suppose that the number of innovators in a certain economy is not 
higher than the number of intermediate goods (i.e., 0<v<2), and suppose that after 
some period t>0, the mandatory firing cost F is reduced to zero. If t>0 is sufficiently 
high, then the reduction of F will not shift specialization toward high-tech products. 
Proof: See the Appendix.  
 
To complete the equilibrium analysis, we briefly describe real wage and 
aggregate output determination (the calculations are presented in appendix A-2). 
Suppose that mˆ  innovators operate in the medium-tech sector while hˆ  innovators 
operate in the high-tech sector. Suppose also that in a certain period t, the quality 
ranks of the state-of-the-art products in the medium and high tech sectors are jx and jz, 
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respectively. By substituting equation (5) and the parameters zx jjhm ,,ˆ,ˆ into equation 
(1) we get the equilibrium wage rates:16 
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Equation (8) can also be obtained by substituting equation (5) into the following labor 
labor-market clearing condition:  
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From equations (1), (5) and (9) we can derive the final good output, which is given 
by:17 
                                                 
16
 Note that the CRS property of the production technology as well as the linearity property of 
intermediate goods' production technology ensures that the equilibrium wage rate wu does not depend 
on labor supply nor output. Thus, equilibrium wage rates wu and ws are not affected by the movement 
of incompetent workers from the high to the medium-tech sector at time β.  
17
 Note that if 0ˆ >m  and 0ˆ >h , then aggregate production of the final good Y must rise after the trial 
period [0,β) since unskilled workers, who were totally unproductive in the high tech sector during 
[0,β), are dismissed and then start working in the medium tech sector where they become productive.  
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3. Comparative Analysis with Macroeconomic Applications  
To demonstrate how employment protection legislation affects economic 
performance we compare between two economies, one with high mandatory firing 
cost and the other with low mandatory firing costs. We start by assuming that both 
economies are closed to trade. In the next subsection we relax this assumption and 
discuss the applications of mandatory firing costs to open economies.   
 
3.1 The Closed Economies Case 
Assumptions: 
(A-1) There exist two closed economies A and B with identical population size L and 
identical number of innovators ν. 
(A-2) Both economies are launched at period t=0, such that quality ranks in both 
economies at period t=0 is j=jx=jz=0.  
(A- 3) The mandatory firing cost in economies A and B denoted by FA and FB satisfies 
the following condition: β
β−<<< 10 BA FF . 
Assumptions (1)-(3) as well as Lemma 4 and Proposition 1 guarantee that 
economy A is more (less) specialized in high-tech (medium-tech) production than 
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economy B, and that this pattern of specialization persists through all periods of time. 
The next Proposition and Lemma prove that this pattern of specialization affects the 
level as well as the growth rates of output and wages in each economy. 
Lemma 5: Suppose that in a certain closed economy 1ˆ0 ≤< m  innovators operate in 
the medium-tech sector while 1ˆ0 << h innovators operate in the high-tech sector. Any 
reallocation of innovators from the medium-tech to the high-tech sector will 
necessarily lead to an increase in the level and growth rates of wage and output.  
Proof: See the Appendix.  
  
 Proposition 3: Output and wage rates in economy A are higher and grow faster than 
in economy B.  
Proof: This proposition follows immediately from Lemma 5. 
 
3.2 Open Economies  
 We now relax the assumption that economies A and B are closed, and assume 
instead that both economies A and B are open to trade. Since final good producers 
from both economies can now import new intermediate goods from abroad, they can 
potentially expand their product variety. Interestingly, if final good producers do not 
face installation (or adjustment) costs then Proposition (3) need not hold, and 
economies A and B might grow at similar rates. If, on the other hand, final good 
producers face adjustment costs when installing new brands of products, then 
economy A might grow faster than economy B, at least for several periods.  
To demonstrate how mandatory firing costs might affect growth patterns in open 
economies, let us assume that final good producers face high adjustment costs when 
purchasing new intermediate goods from abroad, but face relatively low adjustment 
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costs when purchasing these new intermediate goods from domestic sources. The 
rationale of this assumption is that final good producers who purchase new 
intermediate goods from domestic sources procure access to local expertise and 
proficiency which reduces their adjustment costs.  
Let us denote by Mt and Ht the number of intermediate goods of types x and z that 
are already employed in the final good production process at the beginning of period 
t. Let us also denote by ttt MMM −=∆ +1  and ttt HHH −=∆ +1  the number of new 
intermediate goods of types x and z that final good producers intend to purchase and 
to install at period t. We assume that the higher the quantities and the quality ranks of 
the new installed intermediate goods are, the higher are the adjustment costs that final 
good producers must bear.  
Formally, the adjustment costs function is given by: 
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where [ ])/)1(( σσ−=a is a constant parameter, 
 nx, nz are parameters that reflect the effect of imports on adjustment costs 
(specifically, n=1 when intermediate goods are purchased from abroad and n=ε 
((where ε>0 is very small)) when intermediate goods are purchased from domestic 
producers),  
  ξx(⋅) and ξz(⋅) are: 
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The profit function of a final good firm in both economies A and B is therefore: 
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Profit maximization by firms leads to the following first order condition:18 
( ) [ ]
( ) [ ]






∆∆
∂
∂
=−








∆∆
∂
∂
=−








+
+
⋅
−
−
−
−
),()/)1((
)(
),()/)1((
))((
)(
11
1
12
2
1
1
1
1
tt
t
j
tt
t
j
HMC
Mw
Y
HMC
Hwi
iY
σσ
λ
λ
σσ
λ
λ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
    (13)                            
  By substituting equations (8), (10) and (11) into equation (12) we get that the 
rate at which final good producers import medium and high tech products from 
abroad cannot be higher than jM )(
1)(
1λ
=∆  and j
tH
H ))((
1)(
12 +
=∆
λ
, respectively. 
Thus:  
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    (14) 
We now sketch a plausible trade-growth dynamics for economies A and B, 
which in our view might, at least to some extent, explain the US and the European 
trade-growth patterns from the mid 1980s until early 2000.  
Let us assume that previous to period t=T all intermediate goods that exist in 
both economies are of type x only. At period t=T, however, new technologies which 
allow innovators to develop intermediate goods of type z, emerge. The emergence of 
these new types of intermediate goods is analogous to the ICT and other high tech 
products that appeared in the early 1980's mostly in the US (see OECD (2003) for a 
                                                 
18
 Derivation of the profit function with respect to Mt+1 and Ht+1 yields: 
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Substituting equation (5) into these equations yield equation (13) above. 
 23
survey).  However, these technologies are not being developed everywhere. Suppose 
that firing costs in economy A are lower than in economy B, and that the parameters 
FA, FB and T (the period at which the new technologies emerge) are such that the 
conditions in proposition (1) hold. Innovators in economy A, who face low firing 
costs, become biased toward high-tech intermediate goods projects (and therefore 
embark on z-projects), while innovators in economy B who face relatively high firing 
costs continue to be engaged in medium-tech projects only. This change in the pattern 
of project selection affects growth and trade. Final good producers in economy B 
import high-tech products (adopt technology) from producers in Economy A, while 
final good producers in economy A import medium-tech products. However, since 
final good producers in economy A have already used x products (before period T) 
they do not face any adjustment costs when importing x products from economy B, 
while final good producers in economy B are required to adjust to the new z-products 
they import from economy A. Since this adjustment is costly, importation of z-
products from economy A is gradual rather than immediate. Economy A thereby 
grows at a higher rate than economy B, while B economy's growth rates converge to 
that of A.19  
 
4. Asymmetric Information  
In the basic model we made two assumptions that to some readers may seem 
rather restrictive. The first assumption is that all individuals are symmetrically 
uninformed about their type (i.e., they do not know their own type or that of others), 
and the second assumption is that workers who were dismissed from their job, 
immediately find an alternative job and therefore do not bear frictional searching 
                                                 
19
 This pattern of growth trivially follows from proposition 5. 
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costs. In this section we show that the results of the paper carry through even when 
these two assumptions are relaxed. To adjust the basic model to this new setting, 
several additional assumptions are used. Specifically, we assume that: 
• All individuals have a constant relative risk aversion utility function (i.e., 
)1(
1
1 )()( γγ −−= ccu  where γ>0).  
• The production function of intermediate goods is given by: 
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where lu and ls are labor inputs of less competent and competent workers, 
respectively, and 1<θ1<θ2 (i.e., competent workers are more productive in the 
high-tech firms than in the medium-tech firms).20  
• All individuals who are dismissed from their job lose a portion 0<d<1 of their 
salaries (i.e., an employee who was dismissed lose d⋅w).21  
• Subsequent to the trial period [0,β), employers can correctly identify the type 
of their workers with probability (1-ε) and misidentify their workers' type with 
probability ε>0 (ε is assumed to be relatively small and is common knowledge 
among all individuals).  
We also assume that ε>0 is, on the one hand small enough to ensure that all 
competent individuals would be willing to risk working in the high tech firms but, on 
                                                 
20
 The modification we made to the intermediate goods' production function (equation (2')) in 
conjunction with the subsequent assumptions ensures that all workers (competent as well as less-
competent workers) prefer to work in high-tech firms rather than medium tech firms.  
21
 This is a simple way of modeling frictional costs of workers who search for new jobs. The parameter 
d can be regarded as the average portion of time that workers need to spend to find a new job (and 
therefore d⋅w is their income loss). 
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the other hand is sufficiently high to ensure that competent individuals would also be 
willing risk working in the high-tech sector. Specifically:22  
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We now adjust the innovators' profit functions (6) and (7) that have been formulized 
to the new assumptions of asymmetric information and frictional costs. The profit that 
innovators can gain in the x sector is: 
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Lemmas 1 and 2 in the basic model can be easily adjusted to the new profit functions 
as follows.  
Lemma 1':  
(i) Whenever the mandatory firing cost F is lower than ββ )1( − , innovators who upgrade 
and produce a state-of-the-art product of type z would rather dismiss unproductive 
workers than continue to hire them. If, however, F> ββ )1( − , innovators who upgrade 
                                                 
22In order to ensure that less competent workers will always prefer working in the high-tech firms the 
parameters d,ε must satisfy: )())1(()1()()()1( 21 θεεθεε wudwuwuwu ⋅+−⋅−<⋅+⋅− . 
And to ensure that competent workers will always prefer working in the high-tech firms the parameters 
d,ε must satisfy: ))1(()()1()()()1( 21 dwuwuwuwu −⋅+⋅−<⋅+⋅− εθεεθε . 
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and produce a state-of-the-art product of type z would rather continue to hire 
unproductive workers than to dismiss them.   
(ii) For any product i of type z, such that 
2
2 ])1)(1[(
2 )( µθ εµεµµθλ cbi +−−+> , operating  profits are 
positive for all possible mandatory firing costs F. 
(iii) For any product i of type z, such that 
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such that whenever the mandatory firing cost F is higher than )(if , innovators rank 
the  x projects higher than project zi (i.e.,  )()( xFiz π<Π ), and vice versa whenever 
the mandatory firing cost F is lower than )(if , innovators rank the zi project higher 
than the x  projects (i.e. )()( Fx
iz
Π<π ) 
Lemmas 1' and 2' imply that the qualitative properties of the threshold conditions 
in the basic model are preserved under the new assumptions of the model. Since they 
guarantee that lemma 3 and lemma 4 in the previous section still hold, then the main 
result of the paper that employment protection legislation distorts the pattern of 
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specialization in favor of medium-tech firms rather than high-tech firms (and thereby 
slows down the process of economic growth) carries through.  
 
5. Summary 
This paper focuses on the burden that high firing costs place on the screening 
process of human-capital-intensive firms (high-tech). It is shown that when firing 
costs are high and workers productivity is ex ante unknown, innovators will embark 
on relatively less human-capital intensive projects, since the screening process 
become expensive. Firing costs distort the pattern of specialization toward medium-
tech industries rather than high-tech industries and thereby affect output and labor 
productivity growth negatively. This negative effect becomes significant when 
adjustment costs of new products are high. These results are consistent with the US 
productivity revival in the 1990's as well as the evolving US-EU productivity gap. 
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Appendix 
A-1 Mathematical Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 2: Let Z~  denote the set of all products i of type z that 
innovators in economy B did not produce due to high firing cost (i.e., 
)(\]1,0[~ BFZZ = ). Note that 0=izj  for all products in Z
~
.  
Suppose now that at some period T>0 where 
( )
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T ,  
Firing cost FB in economy B is reduced to zero.  
Since the quality rank of all other intermediate goods that are produced is equal to 
j=T (and thereby jx=T to all products is Xt(FB)) then the threshold value 
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21
1
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zj
xj
i
iiif  become less than zero for all 
products in Z~ . 
Thus, even if firing cost FB has declined to zero, innovators will not find it optimal to 
shift their activities from x projects to z projects since the z-projects in Z~ are less 
profitable than the x-projects that where already developed and produced. 
Proof of Lemma 5: First note that whenever hm ˆ,ˆ0 <  the quality rank of all 
intermediate goods that are employed in the economy in period t is j=t. 
 Let ),ˆ,ˆ( jhmgw j = and ),ˆ,ˆ( jhmfYt = denote real wage and aggregate output, 
respectively, as given in equations (8) and (10). It is easy to verify that: 
 (i) 0),ˆ,ˆ( >+− jthtmg
dt
d
, 
 (ii) 0),ˆ,ˆ( >+− jthtmf
dt
d
 , 
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A-2 Labor Market Equilibrium and Final Good's Output Determination 
Market clearing conditions in the labor market are: 
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Substituting equation (5) into equation (*) yields: 
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By substituting the last equation into equation (5) and then into equation (1) we get 
that at the trial period [0,β)   
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and at sub-period [β,1] 
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Substituting this final good output equation into the wage equation (***) yields the 
wage rate equilibrium: 
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Figures 
 Figure 1.    
Quality Rank's Interval of Intermediate Goods 
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Figure 3-A 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
tZ  
F 
v 
F** F* 
Xt 
v 
)(Fi  )(Fi  
 35
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-B 
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Figure 3-C 
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